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Norris Verbal Reports of Thinking and Test Design - 1
Abstract
A methodology is described for using verbal reports of thinking to develop and validate multiple-choice
tests of critical thinking. The procedure included the following steps: devising ideal models of thinking
for each item; developing a method for interviewing subjects; collecting verbal reports of thinking from
samples of subjects; using the ideal models to rate the quality of the thinking portrayed in the reports;
comparing the quality of thinking to answer choices and accumulating those comparisons across
subjects for each item; identifying and modifying suspect items. The methodology is offered as a way
to gather evidence on the truth of claims that currently available multiple-choice critical thinking tests
do not measure critical thinking (McPeck, 1981; Petrie, 1986; Whimbey, 1985) and as a way to develop
new critical thinking tests.
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VERBAL REPORTS OF THINKING AND MULTIPLE-CHOICE
CRITICAL THINKING TEST DESIGN
During the last decade there has been a growing interest in teaching and assessing critical thinking.
But there are few readily available instruments for measuring critical thinking. Furthermore, most of
the ones that are available are multiple-choice and many advocates of critical thinking are particularly
dissatisfied with multiple-choice testing formats (McPeck, 1981; Petrie, 1986). Ignoring for the
moment the empirical support for this dissatisfaction, many critical thinking theorists insist that the
development and validation of critical thinking tests require direct evidence on the thinking processes
the tests require. However, most multiple-choice critical thinking tests are not supported by such
evidence. It seems that in order for multiple-choice testing of critical thinking to be justified (or seen
as justified), then design procedures must be implemented which somehow provide more direct
evidence on the thinking processes that the tests elicit.
This paper describes how verbal reports of examinees' thinking on draft items of multiple-choice
critical thinking tests can be used systematically to provide such evidence. Testing theorists have
endorsed verbal reports of thinking for amplifying the meaning of the constructs a test is measuring
(Cronbach, 1971, p. 474), for representing those constructs by the mental processes which underlie
performance (Embretson, 1983), for directly analyzing the processes underlying item performance
(Messick, 1987, p. 85), or for specifying the intellectual processes used to perform the task (Anastasi,
1988, p. 159). Such endorsements dovetail with the criticisms that there is no direct evidence that
multiple-choice critical thinking tests in fact measure critical thinking (Ennis & Norris, in press;
McPeck, 1981; Petrie, 1986; Whimbey, 1985).
There are very few reported uses of verbal reports of thinking in test development and validation
(Norris, in press). When verbal reports have been used, the information in them rarely has been
analyzed and compiled systematically. Rather, the information has been used casually to support
intuitive judgments about whether items mislead, contain unwanted clues, use unknown vocabulary,
and the like. These are important considerations in test design, but it would be useful to see how
verbal reports of thinking might be used systematically to help make construct validity judgments about
multiple-choice critical thinking tests. As an example, this paper reports how verbal reports of thinking
were used to develop and validate a multiple-choice critical thinking test of observation appraisal. With
suitable adjustments, the approach could be used to examine the validity of multiple-choice tests of
other aspects of critical thinking.
Background
The Role of Observation in Critical Thinking
For the purposes of this study, Ennis's (1987) definition of critical thinking was adopted: "Critical
thinking is reasonable and reflective thinking that is focused upon deciding what to believe or do."
According to Ennis, thinking critically involves the use of basic information (information from others,
from observation, and from previously drawn conclusions) and the process of inference to move from
that basis to decisions about belief and action. Observations are central to critical thinking on this
model, providing as they do some of the information upon which decisions are based. The test
developed during this study is an attempt to measure the ability to appraise correctly reports of
observations.
Motivation
Most definitions of critical thinking, including Ennis's, focus more on the process of thinking than its
products. Paul (1985) argues that for learning to be rational "the process that leads to belief is more
important than belief itself." It is a result of this focus on process that many critical thinking theorists
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doubt that traditional multiple-choice tests can measure critical thinking, since such tests reveal
products of thinking, not thinking itself (McPeck, 1981; Petrie, 1986).
This doubt is not pedantic. Criticisms of existing multiple-choice critical thinking tests have shown that
keyed answers can be reached by thinking uncritically and unkeyed answers by thinking critically (Ennis
& Norris, in press). The criticisms are usually hypothetical and not supported by empirical evidence on
how examinees choose their answers. The point of the criticisms, however, is that there is no direct
evidence one way or the other. Given the lack of evidence, there is a perceived unacceptable risk that
some examinees are rewarded and some penalized unfairly. Such perceptions lead to a skepticism
about the suitability of multiple-choice tests for measuring critical thinking.
A similar conclusion about multiple-choice critical thinking tests can be motivated by research on
thinking in complex domains and within ill-structured problems. Such thinking often must follow
multiple paths to multiple solutions (Resnick, 1987; Spiro, Vispoel, Schmitz, Samarapungavan, &
Boerger, 1987). Thus, one might wonder how multiple-choice tests, which typically demand one
solution, can test for critical thinking in complex domains.
There is, therefore, a concern among advocates of critical thinking that multiple-choice testing cannot
serve well the goal of critical thinking evaluation. On the other hand, multiple-choice tests seem an
appropriate format for testing certain aspects of critical thinking, such as knowledge of the many
principles for appraising the credibility of information. So it is important to know whether they can be
designed to provide more direct evidence on the thinking that underlies performance. Such direct
evidence would place multiple-choice critical thinking tests on a sounder theoretical and empirical
footing. Eliciting verbal reports of thinking on trial test items as described subsequently is one
plausible way to collect the direct evidence desired.
Ability Test Validation
Construct validation should provide an explanation of performance on a test (Cronbach, 1971) by
modelling the mental processes leading to the performance (Norris, 1983). According to this view, one
criterion for judging construct validity of a critical thinking test is the extent to which critical thinking
leads to good performance on the test and uncritical thinking to poor performance.
Construct validity must be inferred, not directly measured, but it is recognized that inferences about
thinking processes based on item statistics and content analysis are untrustworthy (Connolly &
Wantman, 1964, p. 59). Schuman (1966), for instance, has demonstrated that item performance can
show excellent variation, correlate well with other item performances, and be related to other variables
in relevant ways, even though the majority of examinees do not understand the item. As a result, some
testing specialists recommend seeking more direct evidence on examinees' thinking than that contained
in item statistics (Haney & Scott, 1987, p. 365), such as evidence from examinees' verbal reports of
their thinking as they work through test items (Haney & Scott, 1987, pp. 301-2). Evidence of this sort
can support inferences rarely supportable by item analysis data alone (Connolly & Wantman, 1964, p.
62).
Eliciting verbal reports of examinees' thinking is an attempt to gain information on the mental
processes leading to their performance on the test, that is, to learn the information, mental strategies,
and reasoning principles they use in choosing answers. The aim is to look beneath the surface of
answer choices in order to gain more direct insight into the reasons for the choices, so that more
trustworthy inferences can be made about the causes of performance and, derivatively, about construct
validity. In the specific context of testing for critical thinking, the aim would be to use information in
examinees' verbal reports of thinking to judge whether it is differences in critical thinking, and not
something else, that accounts for differences in scores. In order for the procedure to work, a way to
elicit verbal reports and of using the information contained in them needs to be designed and justified.
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Past Use of Verbal Reports of Thinking in Test Design
Verbal reports of thinking have not been used often in test design. When such studies have been
reported, there has been inadequate direction on how the information in verbal reports might be used
to quantify the quality of examinees' thinking, on how to make comparisons between the quality of
thinking as displayed in examinees' verbal reports and their choices of answers, and on how to
accumulate and coordinate these comparisons across several examinees to help judge the validity of
tests.
Bloom and Broder (1950) were among the earliest users of verbal reports of thinking in test
development. They asked a sample of college students to think aloud while they worked through
questions on a problem solving test. The verbal reports yielded relatively consistent and meaningful
data from most students and helped to support inferences from the students' problem solutions to the
thinking which led to the solutions.
Kropp (1956) used verbal reports of thinking to examine the relationship between choosing correct
answers on 10 multiple-choice items and the reasoning used to make the choices. The items were
designed to measure understanding of text with physical science content and were judged to involve
more complex thinking than simply recalling information or locating it in the text. The verbal reports
showed that a great variety of reasoning processes led to choosing correct answers. Since some of
these processes were not justifiable, Kropp concluded that it is hazardous to infer the quality of
reasoning processes on the basis of answers chosen. However, no procedure was described for
determining the tendency for unjustified reasoning to lead to correct answers.
McGuire (1963) used verbal reports of thinking to make medical school certification examinations test
for critical thinking and problem solving and not merely factual recall. Experts in the field were asked
to classify test questions according to a modified Bloom's taxonomy. Medical students were then asked
to think aloud as they worked through the items. McGuire reported that comparing the experts'
classifications to the students' verbal reports helped her to align better the objectives of instruction and
their assessment. However, it is unclear exactly how the verbal reports were examined and how the
information in them was used to develop the test. As in the previously described studies, there is no
specific guidance on how verbal reports of thinking can be used in test development.
Connolly and Wantman (1964) reported a study intended to improve the one of Bloom and Broder.
They studied nine subjects, who were asked to report all the thoughts that might cross their minds as
they worked on a set of 25 verbal analogy items. The adequacy of the subjects' thinking was compared
to a model of ideal thinking on the items. The model was general, rather than item specific, and listed
67 behaviors representing quality of thinking (e.g., "Justifies choice with incorrect logic," and "Reads
stem and immediately states keyed response"). The attempt to use an ideal model of reasoning to
judge verbal reports is significant, but insufficient detail is provided to know what the model is, where it
came from, and how it was used. They concluded that their technique was useful for pretesting items,
but did not mention a role for the technique in test validation. They suggested that the method might
be used to determine whether some students are penalized for having too much knowledge. This
suggestion is particularly relevant to multiple-choice critical thinking testing, because of the allegations
that it is knowledge and not critical thinking that these tests examine.
A study by Schuman (1966) provides the most detailed procedure for using the information in verbal
reports of examinee's thinking. One thousand factory workers and cultivators in East Pakistan
completed an attitude survey and then reported on the reasons for their responses to 10 randomly
selected items. Their reasons were rated on a scale from "1," given to a reason that was very clear and
led to an accurate prediction of the chosen response, to "5," given to a reason that was very unclear and
could not be used to predict the answer chosen. Average scores were calculated for each item across
all individuals and were used to indicate the subjects' understanding of that item; the lower the score
the better the understanding.
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Schuman's procedure for quantifying and using the information in examinees' verbal reports marks an
important difference from previous studies. But the approach is not without problems. For instance,
examinees' reasoning could clearly express a misunderstanding of an item, yet reliably lead to
predictions of their responses. Their reasoning would be assigned "1," and the item would receive a low
average score, even though subjects did not understand it.
In sum, the research on using verbal reports of thinking for developing and validating tests is not
adequate. There have been few systematic attempts to use the information contained in verbal reports
to quantify the quality of examinees' thinking and to accumulate the ratings of quality for each item
across individuals. Furthermore, little emphasis has been placed on developing models against which
reports of thinking might be compared. Verbal reporting techniques have been used rather casually in
designing multiple-choice tests, with the possible exception of Schuman's study.
A Method for Eliciting and Using Verbal Reports of Thinking
To systematically use verbal reports of thinking in the development and validation of multiple-choice
critical thinking tests, particular steps should be followed. This section will use the specific example of
developing and validating the Test on Appraising Observations (Norris & King, 1983) to illustrate the
need for the following general steps:
1. developing a set of critical thinking principles which items would serve to test;
2. devising initial trial items to test the principles;
3. developing models of ideal thinking on each item;
4. developing an interviewing methodology for eliciting trustworthy reports of thinking;
5. collecting verbal reports of thinking on items;
6. scoring verbal reports using the models of ideal thinking as a standard and scoring answers
chosen according to the answer key;
7. comparing thinking on items to performance on them and systematically accumulating these
comparisons across examinees for each item;
8. modifying suspected items;
9. retrying the test in accord with steps 5 to 8.
Developing Principles of Observation Appraisal
In order to assess critical thinking and to compare the quality of examinees' verbal reports of thinking
to their choice of answers, there needs to be some justified standard for rating quality of thinking. The
Test on Appraising Observations was designed to assess ability to appraise reports of observations, so
an early task was to develop a comprehensive and defensible set of principles for appraising
observations. Table 1 presents a sample of the principles which are described comprehensively and
defended in Norris (1984) and Norris and King (1984).
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
The principles do not provide either necessary or sufficient conditions for observation statements to be
credible. They suggest conditions to consider. To the extent that these conditions are satisfied, an
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observation is worthy of belief, and to the extent they are not satisfied, it is worthy of doubt. In any
given case, principles may compete. There are no strict procedures for arbitrating such difficult cases;
good judgement and experience are needed.
The principles find support from a number of sources. For example, those dealing with conflict of
interest, leading questions, and the skill of the observer find support in judicial practice (Brooks, 1983).
The principle about leading questions is also supported by psychological research on eyewitness
testimony (Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981; Loftus, 1979; Wells, Ferguson, & Lindsay, 1981; Yarmey,
1979). Several principles are supported by common-sense psychology. For example, it makes common
sense to think that an observation is more believable when made by a more alert observer.
Devising Initial Trial Items
Initial trial items were written to satisfy a number of criteria. They were in multiple-choice format and
each was written to test ability to use one principle of observation appraisal. Fifty items were cast in
the context of two stories: Part A, the story of a traffic accident, and Part B, the story of a river
exploration. The story context was used in order to provide examinees sufficient context for deciding
which principle of observation appraisal should be applied.
Each item presented two conflicting reports of observations made by characters in the stories and
required examinees to decide which, if either, of the reports is more credible. Comparative judgments
were requested because without the wealth of information available in real situations it is usually not
possible to make absolute judgments about the credibility of single observation statements (Ennis,
1988; Norris & Ennis, in press).
Thus, for each item the three possible answer choices were: the first statement is more credible, the
second statement is more credible, and the statements are equally credible. Multiple-choice items
usually have more than three alternatives to minimize problems of guessing, but only the above three
were used because they are the logically obvious ones given the task.
Developing Models of Ideal Thinking on Each Item
The principles of observation appraisal were used to develop a model of ideal thinking on each item.
As an example, consider Item 3 from Part A, the traffic accident story:
A policewoman has been asking Mr. Wang and Ms. Vernon questions. She asks Mr.
Wang, who was one of the people involved in the accident, whether he had used his
signal.
Mr. Wang answers, "Yes, I did use my signal."
Ms. Vernon had been driving a car which was not involved in the accident. She tells
the officer, "Mr. Wang did not use his signal. But this didn't cause the accident."
Examinees were to choose which, if either, of the italicized statements is more credible. To reason
through this question correctly, an examinee first needs to be able to derive from the text the relevant
information about Wang's and Vernon's involvement. The text is simple enough that most high school
students should have no difficulty with this task. Second, an examinee must retrieve from background
knowledge the relevant facts that not using a turn signal can cause an accident and that being held
responsible for an accident can be troublesome. Again, high school students would have such common
knowledge. Finally, an examinee has to infer that the possibility that one's own testimony can place
one in trouble is an accuracy-reducing factor and, thus, that Wang is less credible than Vernon.
The ideal model of thinking developed for this item is as follows: Mr. Wang was
involved in the accident, but Ms. Vernon was not involved. Mr. Wang is less credible
because his involvement would give him reason to say he used his signal even if he did
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not. Wang is in a conflict of interest. People in a conflict of interest, that is, people
who have something to gain by events being cast as they described them, tend to be
less credible than those who are not in such a situation.
The reasoning required for Item 3 generalizes to the other test items. In order to reason ideally
through the items examinees need to do the following, though not necessarily in the order indicated:
1. Cite the relevant facts in the text which can be used to compare the credibility of the
underlined statements;
2. Use these facts together with relevant background knowledge to make a comparative
evaluation of the credibility of the statements;
3. Show how the evaluation is based on an appropriate general principle which subsumes
the relevant facts in the text under a general accuracy-reducing factor.
Each item on the test was analyzed according to this scheme, models of ideal reasoning for each item
developed, and the models used in a manner described subsequently to rate the quality of examinees'
verbal reports of thinking.
Developing an Interviewing Methodology
An interviewing methodology was designed to elicit examinees' reasoning while they worked through
items on the observation test. In accord with widely advocated practices for collecting verbal reports as
data (Afflerbach & Johnston, 1984; Ericsson & Simon, 1980, 1984; Larkin & Rainard, 1984; Loftus,
1979; Norris, in press) the interviews were as non-leading as possible. The initial directive to
examinees was: "As you do each question tell me all you can about what you are thinking while you are
picking your answer." At this stage, interrupting an examinee's verbal reporting was permitted only to
clarify the ambiguous referent of a pronoun or to point to obvious reading errors.
It is important to obtain records of reasoning that are as complete as possible. To fulfill this aim it is
necessary sometimes to probe beyond the initial instruction to think aloud, while being careful not to
rush examinees by prematurely cutting off their reasoning (Larkin & Rainard, 1984, p. 250), or to
endorse or criticize particular reasoning attempts. Even in such follow-up stages, it is desirable for
probing to be as non-leading as possible, by merely echoing examinees' reported thoughts or by asking
them to explain a little more what they have said.
To meet the above goals and constraints, the interview model given in Appendix A was adopted. It has
three stages. In Stage One the interviewer informs examinees of the general purpose of the interviews
and of their role in them, especially the fact that they will be asked some questions to be answered
verbally.
In Stage Two the interviewer asks examinees to tell all they can about what they are thinking while
choosing their answers. Interruptions to examinees' reports are permitted only to probe for ambiguous
references and for obvious reading errors (See 11.2.1 and 11.2.2). If examinees ask for additional
information or for reasons, the interviewer must respond as in II.3.1, "You can only go by what is
written," or II.3.2, "You can decide only according to what is said and what you know." If examinees
seek feedback on their progress it must not be given (II.4.3).
Stage Three begins after examinees have chosen their response and have finished reporting on their
thinking in response to the directive in (11.1). The interviewing model for this stage consists of a set of
condition-action pairs which guide the actions of the interviewer in accord with the satisfaction of
conditions defined by a combination of examinees' answer choices and the content of their verbal
reports. Each action is designed to match a particular combination by being as non-leading as possible
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and still having a chance to elicit useful information. For any given item and examinee response, only
one numbered step will apply. The strategies listed under 111.4 guide the interviewer when it is not
clear how to proceed given an examinee's report.
The model for Stage Three is used as follows. Starting with III.1 and proceeding sequentially, the
interviewer checks whether the condition (described by the phrase following the "if') is satisfied.
Sometimes the condition is complex, that is, consists of subconditions, so all subconditions must be met
for the condition to be satisfied. If a condition is not satisfied, the interviewer proceeds to the next
numbered step. If satisfied, the interviewer carries out the indicated action (described by the phrase
following the "then"). When the signal, "then proceed to the next item," is reached the interview reverts
to Stage Two.
Collecting Verbal Reports of Thinking
Our experience has shown that a multiple-choice test takes about four-times as long in a verbal
reporting format as in a paper-and-pencil format. Therefore, it is too tiresome for students to be
interviewed on a whole test designed for a regular class period in paper-and-pencil format. However, if
there are story lines in a test, as is the case with the Test on Appraising Observations, or the items are
in a logical sequence for another reason, a student could not be interviewed on a later section without
having completed previous sections. A procedure for interlacing interviewing and paper-and-pencil
formats is needed.
In the example study there were two interviewers. One-half the students were assigned randomly to
each. Within these halves, half was assigned to take Part A of the test and the other half to take Part
B. Each part of the test was divided into two sections representing logical breaks in the story line: Part
A, Section I (Items 1-15) and Section II (Items 16-28); Part B, Section I (Items 29-37) and Section II
(Items 38-50). One-half of the subjects assigned to a part were randomly chosen to be interviewed on
Section I of that part and to complete Section II in paper-and-pencil format; the other half was to write
Section I and be interviewed on Section II.
Each interviewer dealt with two students at a time working on the same part, either A or B, of the test.
First, both students were told how the testing would proceed. The purpose of the study had already
been explained in meetings with students in their classes. The student who was to write Section I of the
part was shown to a place to work alone, told to stop when finished the last item of Section I (either
Item 15 or 37), told not to read on, and to wait to be called by the interviewer. The other student was
interviewed on Section I according to the model in Appendix A. When the interview was over, the
students exchanged places. The student who wrote Section I was interviewed on Section II and the
student who was interviewed on Section I wrote Section II. Students marked their answers to all
questions on a standardized answer sheet.
Scoring Verbal Reports of Thinking and Answer Choices
Performance scores were assigned to answer choices for each item according to whether they agreed (1)
or disagreed (0) with a key based on the set of principles illustrated in Table 1.
Verbal reports were transcribed verbatim. Each student was assigned a thinking score for each item
according to the rating scale in Table 2. The rating scale is based upon the ideal models of thinking
and assigns scores according to how closely students' verbal reports approximate the models. Table 3
shows how the rating scale would work for Item 3.
[Insert Tables 2 & 3 about here.]
For illustration, here are the verbatim transcriptions of the verbal reports of two senior high school
students working on Item 3:
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Student A .. .ah.. .. ah, Mr. Wang, like he probably didn't, like you know, it was just, he probably
thought he used his signal, but really didn't. And Miss Vernon, she was watching so
she'd be able to tell from back if he was using it or not. Right? Being the case, so, I'd
tend to believe Vernon.
Student B I would say that he did use his signal because anybody who's in the car... coming up
to an intersection or anything... he, he usually knows what he's doing. So I'd be
more inclined to believe the first.
Student A chose the keyed response and Student B an unkeyed one. Neither student thought critically
on the item, however, and both were assigned zero for thinking scores. The criteria used by both
students for comparing Wang and Vernon were unsound. Student A's reasoning that Wang just
"thought he used his signal," but Vernon would "be able to tell from back" is arbitrary. It is used to
rationalize a choice of answer rather than to justify it. It is just as reasonable to say that Wang would
"be able to tell from inside that he used his signal" and that Vernon just "thought he did not use his
signal." Student B's reasoning fails to distinguish between Wang's knowing what he had done and his
telling accurately what he had done, and to allow that someone in another car can know what another
driver is doing. So the students' performance scores and thinking scores for Item 3 are as in Table 4.
[Insert Table 4 about here.]
For each student, there was a performance score for each item taken and, for each item done in the
interview, a thinking score also. Performance and thinking scores were conceptually and empirically
independent, as illustrated by the fact that both Student A and Student B thought poorly, but one
answered correctly Item 3 and the other did not. Thinking scores were assigned without reference to
the answer chosen. When appropriate, students were given credit for using correctly criteria other than
those assumed when designing the items. That is, the ideal model of thinking for each item was used as
a guide, but it was possible for reasoning to be rated highly according to general standards of critical
thinking even though it was outside the bounds of the model. For instance, an examinee might reject a
factual presupposition built into an item and reason perfectly acceptably from an alternative
presupposition to other than the keyed response. In such a situation, the thinking score would be high,
but the performance score would be "0."
Comparing Performance and Thinking Scores and Judging Items
A central feature of the test development and validation methodology being described is the
comparison of performance and thinking scores in the evolution of a test. The aim is to adjust items,
or to write new ones, to make a strong relationship between quality of thinking and quality of
performance for each item. The relationship was calculated in two ways: using biserial correlation
coefficients and a thinking/performance index (t/p index) which estimates the net evidence, positive
minus negative, provided for an item by the combinations of examinees' performance and thinking
scores.
Performance scores constitute a dichotomous variable and thinking scores an ordinal variable, both
with assumed underlying normal distributions. The biserial correlation (rb,) is the best to use for
relating variables of this sort, but two problems exist. First, when one of the variables has zero
variance, (e.g., when all examinees get an item wrong), then rb = 0 for the item regardless of scores
on the other variable. However, when all of the ordered pairs of thinking scores and performance
scores for an item are (0,0), then there is a perfect coincidence between thinking poorly and getting the
item wrong. This coincidence is not reflected in the rbis = 0.
The second problem is that when certain assumptions underlying the statistic are violated, r.s > 1
(Kendall & Stuart, 1961). The assumption of underlying normality is crucial for this statistic. In
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addition, rbis is a most efficient estimator of the population parameter (r.o) when the dichotomy
between getting an item right and wrong lies in the middle of the underlying distribution of ability on
the item, and when r = 0. When r = - > 1, rbi is least efficient. For n < 15, which was the case
in this study, rbis > 31. is common.
The thinking/performance index was developed in order to avoid these problems with using the
biserial correlation and also to capture more intuitively the sense of positive and negative evidence for
items contained in examinees' performance and thinking scores. The t/p index is an average, across all
subjects thinking aloud on an item, of the evidence for the quality of that item contained in the
relationships between each subject's thinking and performance scores.
To calculate the t/p index for an item, combinations of thinking and performance scores for each
subject first were weighted as in Table 5. Thinking scores from 0 to 2 only are represented in the table,
since so few scores of 3 were obtained in the samples studied. Any thinking score of 3 was converted to
2. There are thus six possible combinations of thinking scores and performance scores. The weightings
assign ordered degrees of evidence for the quality of an item provided by each of these combinations.
[Insert Table 5 about here.]
Thinking-score/performance-score combinations (0,0) and (2,1) were judged to give the same degree
of positive evidence for the quality of an item, a weighting of + 2. The evidence is positive because, in
the first case, poor thinking is associated with choosing an unkeyed answer and, in the second case,
good thinking is associated with choosing the keyed response. The weighting of +2 was assigned to
reflect that these combinations provide the greatest positive evidence for an item that can be obtained.
Combinations (0,1) and (1,0) were judged to provide the same degree of negative evidence for item
quality, a weighting of -1. The evidence is negative in the first combination because the person would
have thought poorly, but chosen the keyed answer nevertheless. In the second combination, the person
would have thought well but chosen an unkeyed answer. Combination (2,0), assigned a weighting of -2,
was judged to provide more negative evidence than either of the previous two combinations, since the
subject would have thought very well but selected an unkeyed response. Finally, combination (1,1) was
judged to provide positive evidence for an item, but not as positive as the combination (2,1), so was
assigned a weighting of +1.
To compute the t/p index for an item, the weightings of evidence for each subject answering the item
are assigned according to Table 5, averaged, then divided by 2. The index thus defines a range of
evidential weight from -1 to + 1. For students A and B on Item 3 (see Table 4), the weights of evidence
would be -1 and +2, respectively. The t/p index would be .25. This t/p index is not a measure of the
correlation between thinking and performance scores.
The t/p index captures intuitions about the meaning of the data which rbis cannot. Consider the
following two sets of ordered pairs of thinking and performance scores for Items 18 and 38 in Version
B of the Test on Appraising Observations:
{ 18:(2,1) (0,0) (0,0) (2,1) (2,1) (2,1) (2,1) (0,0) (2,1) (2,1) (1,1) (2,1) (2,1) (2,1)}; {38: (0,1) (0,0) (0,1)
(0,0) (0,0) (0,0) (1,0) (0,0) (0,1) (0,0) (1,0) (1,1)}.
For Item 18 all of the thinking/performance combinations are in a positive direction. That is, for each
subject, choosing the keyed answer is associated with thinking well and choosing an unkeyed answer is
associated with thinking poorly. This relationship is reflected in a high rbis = 1338, but of course it is
not clear what such a correlation means. However, comparing Item 38 for which there are 5
mismatches between thinking and performance scores (either combinations (1,0) or (0,1) ), the
computed rbis is still high (1.296). Thus, the computed rb. does not agree with the intuition that for
Item 18 there is a much higher correspondence between thinking well and performing well than for
Norris
Verbal Reports of Thinking and Test Design - 11
Item 38. However, the comparison of t/p indexes for the items does agree with intuition: for Item 18,
the t/p index = .964; for Item 38, it is .334.
I cannot be very specific about the meaning of different sizes of the t/p index, because its properties
need further exploration. But some general things can be said. First, a negative t/p index indicates
that there is more evidence against the quality of an item than there is for it. Such an item should be
discarded or modified. An approximate lower bound of acceptability can be derived on the assumption
that a t/p index should be at least as high as the index which would obtain for random guessing. In
such a situation, all examinees would receive 0 for thinking scores, since quessing randomly is not
thinking critically. For a sample of N students working on the Test on Appraising Observations, N/3
would on average choose the keyed response, receive thinking/performance score combinations of
(0,1) and evidence weightings of -1. The remaining 2N/3 students would choose an unkeyed response,
receive score combinations of (0,0) and evidence weightings of + 2. The t/p index would be .5. So, .5 is
a reasonable approximate lower bound of acceptability for t/p indexes on a three-alternative multiple-
choice test. For a four-alternative test, the lower bound would be .625. Note that these are
conservative lower bounds, since in the situation of random guessing two-thirds of the sample in the
three-alternative case and three-fourths in the four-alternative case receives the highest possible
evidence rating of + 2.
As a sample set of data, Table 6 contains t/p indexes and biserial correlations between item and test
performance (not biserials between thinking and performance scores as have been discussed up to this
point) for Versions B and C of the Test on Appraising Observations. The t/p indexes and item/test
biserials are not highly correlated: .12 (p = .42) for Version B and .30 (p = .03) for Version C.
Therefore, the t/p indexes give different information on item quality than the biserials, so decisions
made about items using the t/p indexes would likely differ from decisions made using the biserials.
This fact suggests that the t/p indexes are worth further exploration, because at least in this research
they did not duplicate information derived from traditional item statistics.
[Insert Table 6 about here.]
Modifying Suspected Items
Item level statistics, such as item difficulty levels, item/test biserial correlations, and t/p indexes, were
used to identify problematic items in experimental versions of the test, but most weight was given to the
t/p indexes. Rounded to one decimal place, there were 16 items with t/p indexes < .5, the computed
lower bound of acceptability. Reasons were sought for these low indexes by examining the transcribed
interviews and asking the following questions:
1. Do examinees understand the task in the intended way, or are the instructions unclear, is
the item systematically misleading, or is the assumed background knowledge outside their
knowledge store?
2. Are examinees thinking critically to arrive at other than the keyed response and, if so,
should the keyed response or the item be changed?
3. Are examinees thinking uncritically yet arriving at the keyed answer and, if so, are there
clues in the text that can be eliminated?
For Version B, all but two of the 16 suspect items, Items 22 and 23, were altered on the basis of
information contained in the verbal reports. Alterations included single word changes, the addition
and deletion of larger amounts of information, and changes to the directions. Items 22 and 23 were not
altered, because they were dclose to the .5 standard of acceptability and it was expected that changes to
the neighboring and thematically closely linked Items 20 and 21 would improve them also.
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An example of changes made to the directions will serve to illustrate how the t/p indexes and the
verbal reports were used together. Recall that Part A of the test was set in the context of a traffic
accident. The Version B directions listed the names of all characters and what they were doing at the
time of the accident. Since there were several characters in the story with different roles, this list
should have helped to keep them straight. But the verbal reports showed that many examinees looked
for direct answers to questions in this information. In one item, for example, characters gave
conflicting reports about how many cars were at the intersection when the accident occurred. One
character was more alert to the traffic and hence a more credible source of information about the
number of cars at the intersection. Coincidentally, that character reported seeing the same number of
cars at the intersection (three) as the directions mentioned were involved in the accident. The verbal
reports showed that several examinees did not consider the characters' alertness, but merely counted
the number of cars mentioned in the directions and chose the keyed answer as a result. These students
thought uncritically, because they equated the number of cars at the intersection with the number
involved in the accident, but chose the keyed response. It is the possibility of just this sort of problem
with multiple-choice tests that advocates of critical thinking find most disturbing.
Retrying the Modified Test
When the 16 suspected items were revised, the new version, Version C, was tried by collecting verbal
reports of thinking on it, calculating t/p indexes, and so on. The t/p indexes and biserial correlations
between item and whole test performance for Version C are in Table 6.
The average t/p index for Version B was 0.58 and for Version C was 0.66, indicating that the changes
had increased the quality of the test. There were no negative t/p indexes for Version C and, of the 16
items on Version B with indexes < .5, 10 had their indexes raised to > .5. Only one item of the 16
received a lower t/p index for Version C.
On the other hand, 5 items on Version C obtained t/p indexes < .5 which had indexes > .5 on Version
B. The interviews for both versions were examined. For items 3, 4, 7, and 8 there was a common error
in students' thinking which was largely responsible for the low t/p indexes. In each item, several
students made their choice solely on the basis of who was the driver of a car, on the grounds that a
driver would be more alert to the traffic than a pedestrian or passenger. For example, in Item 3 on
Version C, Mr. Wang was a driver and Ms. Vernon "watched the accident happen." Several students
chose Mr. Wang's statement as more believable because he was a driver and thus more alert to road
conditions. These students were assigned thinking scores of 1 for recognizing this important factor,
even though they neglected the more important fact that Wang was in a conflict of interest. Thus, they
chose an unkeyed response but thought fairly well, contributing to a lowered t/p index. The obvious
change was to make both Wang and Vernon drivers, as is the case in the version of Item 3 cited
previously as an example.
The patterns of thinking and performance score combinations for the remaining seven items with t/p
indexes < .5 were examined. No systematic problems could be discerned in the items, so it was
decided not to make further changes.
Discussion and Conclusions
Verbal reports of thinking on trial items of multiple-choice critical thinking tests seem useful and
important from at least three perspectives. First, existing multiple-choice critical thinking tests are
often criticized because they give no direct evidence of the process of thinking that leads to examinees'
choices of answers. If we assume that such direct evidence is needed, then the criticism is certainly
justified, because multiple-choice critical thinking tests have traditionally been constructed without
direct evidence on the thinking processes used to answer items on them.
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Second, multiple-choice critical thinking tests could serve several useful purposes if they were valid.
They are useful when testing groups of students, when time for grading is at a premium, and when
knowledge of several criteria and principles of critical thinking is being tested. That is, multiple-choice
critical thinking tests can fill a particular set of roles, though they likely cannot serve all the needs of
critical thinking assessment. For instance, multiple-choice tests probably cannot assess ability to think
critically in complex situations where solutions are radically underdetermined by available information.
Third, direct evidence on the information, strategies, and principles that examinees use to answer
multiple-choice critical thinking items would be directly relevant to the construct validity of the tests.
Construct validity is concerned with the causes of test performance. A critical thinking test would be
valid to the extent that the cause of good performance is thinking critically and the cause of poor
performance is thinking uncritically. Verbal reports of examinees' thinking on trial versions would
provide information directly relevant to making such causal explanations of performance in the context
of test use. In the context of test design, direct evidence from examinees' verbal reports would be
gained on the causes of their performance. Based on this evidence, items would be discarded,
modified, or retained so that, to the extent possible, the cause of performance is degree of the relevant
aspects of critical thinking ability. In the context of use, the test would inherit the weight of the direct
evidence gathered in the design context, even though in the use context no direct evidence would be
gained on the causes of performance. If the examinees are reasonably similar in relevant
characteristics to those sampled during the design, then there is a very small chance that for any given
examinee there would be a systematic mismatch across items between the examinee's critical thinking
and the answers chosen. Thus, by collecting direct evidence on thinking during the design stage of
multiple-choice critical thinking tests, the advantages of relatively easy administration and scoring can
be had while avoiding one of the main shortcomings of multiple-choice tests, their failure to provide
direct evidence on thinking processes.
A verbal reporting methodology developed for the design of one test is not likely to be directly usable
for another. So the procedure described in this paper is best thought of as exemplifying a methodology
rather than providing a formula for other tests. The methodology has been adapted for the
construction and validation of an inference test in reading comprehension for middle school students
(Phillips, in press). In that study, in addition to using verbal reports as a source of evidence on the
quality of items, verbal reports were used to construct distractors plausible to examinees who did not
know the correct answers. The distractors were constructed to portray typical poor reasons which were
given for answer choices. It would be worthwhile to study this technique with tests in other subjects.
In addition to test development, the verbal reporting procedure would be useful for evaluating the
claims that currently available multiple-choice critical thinking tests do not measure critical thinking
(Ennis & Norris, in press; McPeck, 1981; Petrie, 1986; Whimbey, 1985). For instance, the procedure
could be adpated for studying the validity of the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson &
Glaser, 1980) and the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman, 1985), two of the
oldest and most widely used multiple-choice critical thinking tests.
There are a number of possible outcomes of such studies. First, there is the possibility that the
criticisms of these tests would be sustained. This would be unfortunate, because it would cast doubt on
much of the research on the effectiveness of critical thinking instruction which used the tests as
criterion measures. Another possible result is a clearer understanding of the range of applicability of
existing critical thinking tests. Many multiple-choice critical thinking tests are advertised for use over
wide age ranges. For example, The Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X is said to be usable from
Grade 4 to Grade 14 and the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal from Grade 9 on up. These
ranges include individuals who differ widely in intellectual sophistication, empirical knowledge of the
world, and test-taking experience, so it is quite plausible that the tests are not equally suitable across
the entire ranges. A study of the verbal reports of thinking of examinees from different groups would
provide direct evidence on the range of suitability of each test. A possible consequence is that the
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range for each test will need to be narrowed. Another possibility is that answer keys might be
adjustable to match more suitably the critical thinking of examinees of different age levels.
The verbal reporting approach itself needs further study. One aspect needing examination is the
procedure for comparing thinking and performance scores. The biserial correlation is clearly not
suitable, but the t/p index needs further analysis. In particular, a closer analysis of the meaning of the
t/p index is required, especially of the minimally acceptable level of the t/p index to declare that an
item is working adequately. In this study, the t/p index for random responses was taken as the
minimally acceptable value. But several items on the final version of the Test on Appraising
Observations received lower indexes than this, even though it was not obvious how the items might be
improved.
The elicitation of verbal reports of thinking also needs to be studied with respect to different types of
test content, different elicitation procedures, and different types of examinees. It is known, for
instance, that different questioning procedures can affect differently the reports eyewitnesses give of
events (Loftus, 1979). Can different approaches to eliciting verbal reports of thinking alter what
examinees report? One study (Norris, in press) shows that verbal reports of high school students'
thinking are not easily altered by asking them more leading questions, and that performance scores
while giving verbal reports are the same as performance scores in a paper-and-pencil test taking
situation. This is promising. But would verbal reporting work as well with other groups and other
testing situations?
Indirect evidence for the value of the approach can be found by examining standard indicators of test
validity and reliability. The Cornell Critical Thinking Test (Ennis & Millman, 1985) and the Watson-
Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser, 1980) provide criteria for judging the validity of
the Test on Appraising Observations and hence of indirectly judging the effectiveness of the verbal
reporting technique. It was expected that the Test on Appraising Observations should be about as
reliable as the Cornell and Watson-Glaser Tests. Those tests have, respectively, 71 and 80 items,
whereas the Observations Test has 50 items. This fact would tend to make the Observations Test less
reliable. However, the Cornell and Watson-Glaser Tests both attempt to measure several aspects of
critical thinking, while the Observations Test focusses on one aspect, facts which would tend to make
items on the Observations test intercorrelate more highly and its reliability higher. On balance, then,
the reliability of the Test on Appraising Observations was expected to be about equal to the other two
Tests.
Table 7 reports the range of reliabilities for the three tests computed from the performance of four
groups of senior high school students from Southern Ontario, Canada. The mean reliability for the
Observations test is less than that for the other two tests, though approximately equal that for the
Cornell Test. If the outliers from the Test on Appraising Observations (Group D) and from the
Watson-Glaser Test (Group A) are dropped, the mean reliabilities for the three tests, are virtually
identical.
[Insert Table 7 about here.]
It was also expected that the correlation of the Observations Test with the Cornell Test should be
higher than with the Watson-Glaser Test (assuming the three tests to be valid). The rationale for this
expectation is that the Cornell Test includes a section of 24 items on judging the credibility of reports
of observations, but the Watson-Glaser has no items on judging credibility.
Table 8 provides correlations among the three tests for the four groups of Ontario students. In three of
the four cases the correlation with the Cornell Test is higher than with the Watson-Glaser. But the
correlations are not too high, indicating that the Observations Test is measuring something different
from the other two tests.
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[Insert Table 8 about here.]
The verbal reporting methodology thus led to a test which meets several expectations held for it. This
is evidence for the value of the methodology. Therefore, eliciting verbal reports of examinees' thinking
on multiple-choice critical thinking tests, comparing the information in the verbal reports to examinees'
choices of answers, and using these comparisons to systematically weigh and balance the evidence for
the quality of items, seems a valuable approach for developing and validating such tests. In particular,
it is a way to satisfy two competing desires of many proponents of critical thinking: the desire to use
multiple-choice critical thinking tests, because they provide a convenient way to gather information on
students' critical thinking, and the desire to have information on the process, not just the products, of
that thought.
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Table 1
Principles for Appraising Observations
I. Observation statements tend to be more credible than inferences based upon them.
II. An observation statement tends to be credible to the extent that the observer:
1. is alert to the situation and gives his or her statement careful consideration;
2. has no conflict of interest;
3. is skilled at observing the sort of thing observed.
III. An observation statement tends to be credible to the extent that the observation conditions:
1. provide a satisfactory medium of observation;
2. provide sufficient time for observation;
3. include adequate instrumentation, if instrument is used.
IV. An observation statement tends to be credible to the extent that the observation statement:
1. is corroborated;
2. is made close to the time of observing;
3. is not given in response to a leading question.
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Table 2
Rating Scale for Assigning Thinking Scores
Rating Basis of Evaluation
1 ........ The examinee indicates a criterion by which a correct comparison of the
underlined statements might be made, or the examinee uses a criterion in
comparing the two statements but does not explicitly indicate what the criterion is.
2 ........ The examinee indicates a criterion and uses it correctly to compare the underlined
statements.
3 ........ The examinee indicates a criterion, uses it correctly to compare the underlined
statements, and justifies the comparison on the basis of a general principle.
0o........ The examinee does none of the above, does not think critically in some other way,
or does not respond.
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Table 3
Assigning Thinking Scores for Item 3
1 ........ The examinee points out that Mr. Wang was involved in the accident.
2........ The examinee points out that Mr. Wang was involved in the accident and
compares Mr. Wang's involvement to Ms. Vernon's being a bystander.
3........ The examinee points out that Mr. Wang was involved in the accident, compares
this with Ms. Vernon's non-involvement, and shows that these facts put Wang in a
position of people who stand to profit or lose depending upon what they say.
0o........ The examinee does none of the above, does not think critically in some other way,
or does not respond.
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Table 4
Two Students' Performance and Thinking Scores for Item 3
Student Performance Thinking
Score Score
A 1 0
B 0 0
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Table 5
Evidence Weightings for Thinking Score/Performance Score Combinations
Thinking Scores
Performance 0 1 2
Scores
0 +2 -1 
-2
1 
-1 +1 +2
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Table 6
T/P Indexes and Item/Test Biserials for Versions B and C
T/P Indexes Item/Test Biserials
Item No. Version B Version C Version B Version C
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
.462
.731
.616
.615
.885
.769
.577
.385
.769
.346
-.231
.583
.458
.208
.625
.536
.715
.964
.786
.885
.885
.412
.346
.731
.615
308
385
538
.423
.346
.387
.654
.423
.692
.625
.833
.958
.917
.131
.185
.354
.301
.186
.296
.182
.437
.150
.417
.074
.201
.282
374
.123
.313
.409
.447
.411
.294
.323
.337
.249
.409
.361
.156
.258
.150
.182
.223
.302
.139
.371
.219
.471
.457
.454
.497
Norris
Verbal Reports of Thinking and Test Design - 25
Table 6 (continued)
Item No. Version B Version C Version B Version C
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
.250
.250
.429
.429
.679
.769
.333
.413
.750
.875
.423
.346
.692
.654
.538
.769
.461
.731
334
.833
.625
.250
375
.958
.917
.750
.833
.500
.958
.667
.708
.708
.850
.800
.800
.700
.300
.750
.500
.450
.800
.400
.550
.550
.650
.250
.327
.417
.299
.419
.290
.488
.538
.292
.365
.067
.248
.349
.358
.222
.462
.428
.403
.520
.211
.350
.428
.333
.459
.234
.368
.221
.313
.314
.374
.294
.323
.337
.249
.409
.361
.156
.258
.150
.182
.223
.302
.139
.371
.219
.471
.457
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Table 6 (continued)
Item No. Version B Version C Version B Version C
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
.209
.875
.667
.958
.833
.917
.708
.750
S.650
.700
.500
.750
.950
.800
.750
.950
.433
.264
.400
.501
.476
.448
.475
.329
.454
.497
.234
.368
.221
.313
.314
.374
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Table 7
KR-20 Reliability Estimates for TAO, CCTT, and W-G
Test
Group TAO CCTT W-G
A .76 .74 .92
B .68 .71 .72
C .73 .78 .76
D .58 .71 .74
Average .69 .72 .80
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Table 8
Correlations between TAO, CCTT, and W-G
Test
Group CCTT 
W-G
A .62 
.37
B .49 
.11
C .45 
.37
D .35 
.41
Appendix A
Interviewing Model for Test on Appraising Observations
Stage One
1.1 Inform examinee of purpose of interview: to find out what he or she is thinking while choosing
answers to questions on the test.
1.2 Inform examinee of his or her role: to respond as completely as possible to the questions asked
on the test.
Stage Two
II.1 Interviewer says to examinee:
"As you do each question tell me all you can about what you are thinking while you are picking
your answers."
11.2 Interviewer can interrupt examinee's narrative only to:
11.2.1 probe for ambiguous reference of demonstratives or third person pronouns by saying:
"Could you tell me what you mean by... ?
Example: When doing Item 3 the examinee says: "This driver here is more believable."
Probe immediately: "Could you tell me what you mean by 'this driver here'?"
11.2.2 probe for obvious reading mistakes by saying:
"Did you read... ?" (Do not endorse answers.)
Example: When doing Item 3 the examinee reads: "Mr. Wang did use his signal" for
"Mr. Wang did not use his signal." Probe immediately: "Did you read 'Mr.
Wang did use his signal'?"
1.3 Interviewer can respond to examinee's questions only as follows:
11.3.1 If examinee probes for facts, say: "You can only go by what is written."
Example: When doing Item 3 the examinee asks: "Was Vernon dose enough to see
Wang's car?" Answer only: "You can only go by what is written."
11.3.2 If the examinee probes for reasons, say: "You can decide only according to what is said
and what you know."
Example: When doing Item 3 the examinee asks: "How did Vernon know what caused
the accident?" Answer only: "You can decide only according to what is said
and what you know."
1.4 General cautions:
II.4.1 Do not begin to speak immediately after the examinee stops; give the examinee a few
seconds to continue.
11.4.2 Do not cut off examinee's reasoning by in any way signalling that enough has been said,
even though the examinee might seek such signals.
11.4.3 Do not endorse or criticize the examinee's fact-finding or reason-giving.
Stage Three
111.1 If "neither" is the answer chosen, then say: "So you believe neither is more believable?" Wait for
examinee to respond and then proceed to next item.
111.2 If the item is an inference vs. observation question, that is, a question testing Principle I in Table
1, and
111.2.1 If the examinee identifies a criteriona, makes a comparison on the basis of that
criterion, and cites a general principle, then proceed to the next item.
111.2.2 If the examinee identifies a criterion, makes a comparison on the basis of that criterion,
but cites no general principle, then probe: "So (state the criterion mentioned) makes
the difference?" with emphasis on the statement of the criterion. Wait for the examinee
to respond and then proceed to the next item.
111.2.3 If the examinee identifies a criterion, but makes no comparison on the basis of that
criterion, then probe: "Could you tell me more about the difference (state the criterion
mentioned) makes to your thinking?" Wait for the examinee to respond and then
proceed to the next item.
111.2.4 If the examinee does not identify a criterion, then probe: "Could you explain a little
more what makes you believe one report more than the other? Wait for the examinee
to respond and then proceed to the next item.
111.3 If the item tests any principle other than Principle I, and
III.3.1 Same as 111.2.1
111.3.2 Same as 111.2.2
HI13.3 Same as HI.2.3
111.3.4 If the examinee does not identify a criterion, then probe: "Did (state the criterion
assumed when designing the item) play any part in your thinking?" If the response is
affirmative, then probe: "Could you explain the part it played?" Wait for the examinee
to respond and then proceed to the next item. If the response is negative, then proceed to
the next item.
111.3.5 If the examinee explicitly rejects as a criterion the one assumed when designing the
item, then probe: "Could you tell me some more about why (state the criterion
assumed when designing the item) does not make a difference to your thinking?" Wait
for the examinee to respond and then proceed to the next item.
III.4 Interviewing strategies for Stage Three
111.4.1 If the examinee identifies more than one criterion including the one assumed when
designing the test, then probe about the assumed criterion.
111.4.2 If the examinee identifies more than one criterion not including the one assumed when
designing the test, then probe for the first one identified.
111.4.3 If there is doubt about categorizing a response, then choose the less leading probe, that
is, the one that comes first on the list.
aA criterion is a fact or combination of facts cited in the text that can be used to make a comparison
between the observers, observation conditions, or observation reports. In Item 3, the criterion is the
combination of facts that Wang was involved in the accident and Vernon was not involved.


